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Liberal political theory assumes that the separation of the public from the 
private sphere is natural and therefore woman’s subordination to man is 
inherent. The backdrop of this dichotomy appears to reinforce gender 
stereotyping since it constructs woman to reflect an apolitical nature of a 
subject in a political system. Man’s behaviour, on the other hand, is 
portrayed as the standard political behaviour against which a woman is 
supposed to measure. Viewed from the perspective of the dichotomy, 
politics is reduced to “man” and hence its masculinisation. 
Camouflaging its exclusionary tendencies, liberal theory purports to 
employ “universal”- neutral static language which is “sexual-blind” 
such as “individual”, “citizen”, “worker”, “equality”, and 
“representation”. Liberalism therefore makes universal rationality the 
essence of humanity and the basis of its epistemology and politics. This 
article examines the core of liberalism as one of the sources of gender 
discrimination in politics. 
 





Political theories are not neutral and natural. They were formulated to 
reflect the socio-economic and political context of a given space and time. 
The theories are therefore infused with the experiences, perspectives, 
understandings and assumptions of their creators about human nature and 
relationships. By the same token, the language that is imbedded within the 
body of these theories reflects the context within which they originate. In 
the Western and colonial societies, for example, the creators of the 
language, norms, laws, and practices of the dominant culture and ideology 
were white, economically privileged, formally educated, able-bodied, 
heterosexual (or at least not openly homosexual or bisexual) men. Men 
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with power created the dominant cultural discourses - languages, 
symbols, disciplines and institutions that control political, legal, 
economic, social, scientific and organizational practices governing a 
gendered society (Bender 1990). Arguably, women were inevitably 
excluded from the studies designed to produce knowledge of the 
dominant discourses, theories and practices. It is through this 
exclusionary process that the language of political theories carries with it 
the fallacy of gender stereotyping by constructing woman as apolitical 
subject of the political system. In this article, the liberal philosophy and 
theories are critically examined. Toward that grand objective, the 
public/private paradigm and its underpinning social contract (consent) 
theory form the core of this discussion. The intention is to revisit and 
destabilize the fallacy of gender stereotyping as imbedded in the language 
of political theory. The main argument of this article is that political 
theories and classical studies have been at the centre stage of perpetuating 
gender stereotyping with the effects of rendering women incompetent 




This is a literature review-based article. It employs mainly secondary 
materials particularly classical and contemporary works on liberalism. 
The materials are critically reviewed using three thematic areas namely 
gender stereotyping, rationality, and universality. The purpose is to 
delineate exclusionary tendencies of liberalism based on gender. This 
approach is useful in so far as it interrogates the controversial facets of 
liberalism on its inclusivity and exclusivity along a gendered perspective. 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Gender Stereotyping in Politics 
Theorizing politics is a discourse which has yet to be closed. With the 
publication of the Aristotle’s The Politics, in which various constitutions 
are studied to establish the best method of a government, the debate on 
what constitutes “the political” began. The central questions in the 
discourse revolve around two definitional issues: the scope and nature of 
politics as well as who should participate in politics and why. In 
examining this discourse, two frames of references are considered here 
for the sake of space. The first frame is called institutionalist perspective. 
This views politics as confined to the state and its related institutions. 
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Politics, in this sense, comprises of public and formal affairs of the 
government.  
 
Putting this point in perspective, Nnoli (1986) posits that an action of the 
bishop can be differentiated from that by a president in that the 
president’s order is authoritative since it has the back-up of the 
sanctioning power of the state. With coercive forces such as police, army, 
prison and courts, the president is fully vested with powers that can be 
used to implement his or her decisions. In contrast, the bishop, without 
these supportive instruments is unable to effectively sanction his or her 
followers. This view seems to carry the problem of academic 
reductionism. For one thing, if the same activities, such as elections, 
conflicts, and decision-making take place within the church, schools, 
trade unions and so forth, can’t one argue that these are church politics, 
school politics, union politics respectively? To define politics strictly 
around the affairs of the state is to fail to appreciate other spaces and 
forms of politics. This view restricts the meaning of politics to the old 
fashion of the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 that recognised state as a 
sovereign entity with the right to exercise power in a hierarchical order. In 
contrast, the instrumentalist perspective views politics as an exercise of 
power game. It is argued that when “X” influences “Y” so that the latter 
accomplishes the wishes of the former which without that influence 
nothing would have happened, power is assumed to have been exercised 
(French and Raven, 1959).  
 
This definition is broader in the sense that it views power to transcend the 
state to other non-state actors. It allows one to appreciate politics at both 
micro and macro level organisations. One omission in this definition is 
that it does not state who should own and exercise that power against 
who. It also assumes that power is static and exercised in one direction. 
Power, in this way, seems to be a means to an end an end in itself. To put 
it differently, power as we shall see later, is seen to be confined to the 
public sphere, the sphere of man. If that is the correct interpretation as 
given by the public/private paradigm, one is supposed to see power 
flowing from men to women in their private sphere. In a way, men are the 
ones who possess power and exercise the same over women. From these 
derivations, politics is inherently infused with patriarchal assumptions of 
power that control knowledge – reasoning and rationality. In the Estonian 
System theory, political system is arranged in terms of ‘demand-political 
system-supply’ logic (Easton, 1965). It assumes that the system operates 
in response to the demands from the environment i.e., citizens. These 
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should have the capacity to demand from the state: activities and services 
since the government through a social contract (formed during election) 
promised to deliver them in exchange for votes and support, mainly 
through compulsory taxation. To be sure, politics being a formal activity 
in the public sphere automatically excludes women to play their role. 
Thus, one may put that the premise on which politics and its discipline – 
political science is founded, is essentially a male domain. And therefore, 
all theories, research and studies derived from politics are biased to 
favour men. Pateman (1989) aptly argues that the power of men over 
women “is excluded from scrutiny and deemed irrelevant to political life 
and democracy by the patriarchal construction of the categories within 
which political theorists work”. 
 
Attesting to this view Lovenduski (1981) posits that the dominant 
conception of political studies excludes women “largely because women 
usually do not dispose of public power, belong to political elites or hold 
influential positions in government institutions”. As it can be deduced 
from these authors, Pateman primarily criticises the institutional focus of 
liberal political theory while Lovenduski questions the instrumentalist 
view of positivist political science. Indeed, both the institutional and 
instrumental conceptions of politics focus on the public sphere of decision 
making. It is from this backdrop that Pateman (1989) proceeds to claim, 
“both women’s exclusion from the public world and the manner of our 
inclusion have escaped from the notice of political theory”. The 
instrumental and institutional views of politics are criticised to be 
restrictive and biased. The feminist assertion that “the personal is 
political” destabilized the previous definitions of politics. Phillips (1998) 
went further to say that “politics” was subjected to such devastating 
criticism that it threatened to dissolve as a distinct category of analysis. 
From the above observations, it can be noted that the definition of politics 
is intertwined with gender stereotyping. In that sense, the relationships 
between men and women are shaped by using “constructs” which mask 
world’s reality about the nature of man and woman (Archer and Lloyd, 
2002). From the work of social psychologists, a stereotype is employed to 
connote a set of beliefs typical to personal attributes of a group of people.  
Koch (2000) argues that, though “stereotype” was once considered a 
pejorative term, the cognitive approach in social psychology now regards 
it in a more neutral manner, viewing it as a heuristic employed to decide 
whether a target possesses a particular attribute.  
 
79
Huria Journal vol. 27 (1), March 2020 
Thus, gender stereotypes are mere social and cultural constructs. They are 
essentially rooted in the historically socialized roles that have 
encompassed the lives of men and women. To that extent, they constitute 
beliefs people hold about members of the categories man and woman. 
Existing in a bipolar axis, these stereotypes provide mainly three 
assumptions: that women and men are fundamentally different; that men 
are superior to women and that men are logical and rational, the attributes 
which women seem to lack. From the outset, stereotypes are basically of 
two types. The first type is named belief stereotypes. These refer to the 
ideologies and policy preferences that are ascribed to men and women, 
and the second one is called trait stereotypes which concern with personal 
qualities that are inferred about men and women (Fox and Oxley, 2003). 
In line with this view, Archer and Lloyd (2002) for example point out that 
in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, God created woman as the helpmate of 
man but not his equal. This divine view seems to take woman’s 
subordination to man as the natural order of the day. It is not uncommon 
to find that in most teachings of other major religions, woman occupies 
this inferior status. Sabbah (1984) puts that, “Muslim culture has built-in 
ideological blindness to economic dimension of women, who are 
ordinarily perceived, conceived and defined as exclusively sexual 
objects.” One peculiar element about stereotype is generalization. Women 
are clustered and lumped together as if they form a homogeneous social 
category. Almond and Verba (1963) study on civic competence is 
exemplary to bring this point home. 
 
In this study, women are generalized as incompetent political beings. 
They dislike politics and would not participate in that game. Meena 
(2001) seems to concur with Almond and Verba when she observed those 
people who never follow politics in Tanzania to be women who 
accounted for 61 percent against men who comprised 39 percent. The 
simple reason advanced for this difference is that most women live in 
rural areas and particularly those who did not attend the formal schooling. 
One of the omissions in Meena’s analysis is to fail to question the nature 
of that education. If the theories, discourses, as well as practices of 
education are infused with gender stereotyping, it is no wonder that such 
education will perpetuate the gender gap between men and women. In this 











Rationality in Liberalism 
The emergence of liberal political theory is associated with the rise of 
capitalism in Western Europe around 17th Century. The theory is 
essentially grounded on the conception of human beings as rational 
agents. Rationality has three distinct elements: firstly, the mental 
capacity; secondly, as a property of individuals rather than of groups; and 
thirdly, as a capacity that is possessed in approximately equal measure at 
least by all men (Jaggar, 1983). Like any other political theory, in 
developing its vision of the good society, liberal political theory 
incorporates some assumptions about the nature of men and women. To 
be sure, the liberal conception of the good society naturally is the one that 
advocates the basic liberal values of protecting the dignity of each 
individual and promote individual autonomy and self-fulfilment. This 
means that individuals should enjoy maximum freedom that is not 
impeded by others. Paradoxically, impediment is a likely permanent 
human condition.  
 
Liberal theorists therefore devise a state as a social institution that will 
protect each individual’s right to a fair maximum autonomy and self-
fulfilment. They are however, very cautious of the potential dangers of a 
state to abuse its role as a custodian of protection of liberty. Hence, they 
limit the legitimate state intervention in the life of individuals. This 
limitation resulted into what is commonly referred to as the public and 
private spheres. The public/private paradigm contends that society is 
broadly divided into two spheres i.e. the public and private spheres. The 
public sphere according to this paradigm is characterized by power, 
wealth, rule, rationality, career and reasoning. In contrast, the private 
sphere is predominated by domestic activities as well as child bearing 
(Arneil, 2001). It should be noted right from the outset that, political 
theory and the classical studies are accused to have a share in reinforcing 
and widening this dichotomy. They construct woman to reflect the 
apolitical nature of a subject in a political system. Man’s behaviour, on 
the other hand, is always taken as the standard political behaviour against 
which a woman is supposed to measure herself. The dichotomy thus 
reduces politics to “man”. By so doing, politics is being masculinised. 
Nikolas (1987) reaffirms this view in a more explicit way: 
 
The division between public and private is traced back in political 
and social philosophy at least as far as Aristotle's distinction 
between polis and oikos and up to the natural rights theories of 
John Locke. However, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
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the distinction is reposed in terms of the division between home 
and market. It is given a philosophical foundation in the liberal 
political philosophy of J. S. Mill and his followers, with the 
opposition between the realm of legitimate public regulation and 
the realm of freedom from intrusion, personal autonomy and 
private choice. Writers point to the particular associations in 
these texts between the public sphere - the world of work, the 
market, individualism, competition, politics and the state - and 
men, and the corollary association of women with the private, 
domestic, intimate, altruistic and humanitarian world of the home. 
 
Stevens claims that, “The traditional division confined women largely to 
the domestic sphere and to the reproduction and nurture of children as 
their primary role, while generally affording a much greater share of both 
power and resources to men. However, this division is being 
undermined...In particular, modern market-driven capitalism tends to treat 
everyone alike, whether as a factor of production (a worker) or a 
consumer” (Stevens, 2007). This position asserts that capitalism is fair to 
everyone, something which is not true. It ignores critical questions like 
ownership of the major means of production and factors of production. 
Gatens (1992) posits that “Liberal feminists conceive the problem of 
women’s confinement to the private sphere as central to their low socio-
political status. Equality, wealthy and opportunity are located in the 
public sphere. Hence the issue of providing women with access to power 
becomes the issue of providing them with equal access to the public 
sphere. The state is obliged to provide women with the same 
opportunities it provides for men.” Nonetheless, the question as to what 
constitutes a state is side skipped. In A Vindication of the Rights of 
Women (1792), Mary Wollstonecraft argued forcefully that women had 
the potential of full rationality and as a result were as capable as men of 
complete moral responsibility. She specifically argued that: 
 
Men and women must be educated, in great degree, by the 
opinions and manners of the society that they live in. In every age 
there has been a stream of popular opinion that has all carried 
before it, and given a family character, as it were, to the century. 
It may then fairly be inferred, that, till society be differently 
constituted, much cannot be expected from education. It is, 
however, sufficient for my present purpose to assert, that, 
whatever effect circumstances have on the abilities, every being 
may become virtuous by the exercise of its own reason; for if but 
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one being was created with vicious inclinations, that is positively 
bad, what can save us from atheism? Or if we worship a God, is 
not that God a devil?  
 
The above quotation is instructive to the solution of women’s invisibility 
in the private sphere. It shows that the problem lays in the whole issue of 
“rationality” which seems to be deficient in women. Mary thinks that 
education is the only way to strengthen women. In his The Subjection of 
Man (1869), John Stuart Mill dismisses the natural difference on 
rationality between men and women. He contends that if men had ever 
been found in a society without women, or women without men, or if 
there had been a society of men and women in which the women were not 
under the control of men, something might have been positively known 
about the mental and moral differences which may be inherent in the 
nature of each. And therefore, what is now called as the nature of women 
is eminently artificial thing – the result of forced oppression in some 
directions, unnatural stimulation in others. Mill’s view sharply contradicts 
John Locke’s social contract theory that the separation between the public 
and private spheres is natural and therefore for woman to be subordinate 
to man is inherent. In the Sexual Contract, Pateman (1988) vehemently 
criticizes the “social contract theory” and reduces it to “sexual contract”: 
The logic of contract as exhibited in ‘surrogate’ motherhood 
shows very starkly how the extension of the standing on 
‘individual’ to women can reinforce and transform patriarchy as 
well as challenge patriarchal institutions. To extend to women the 
masculine conception of the individual as owner, and the 
conception of freedom as the capacity to do what you will with 
your own, is to sweep away any intrinsic relation between the 
female and owner, her body and reproductive capacities. She 
stands to her property in exactly the same external relation as the 
male owner stands to his labour power or sperm; there is nothing 
distinctive about womanhood. 
 
The point to be noted here is that sex matters and there is no legitimate 
way to avoid referring to it. The social contract theorists want us to 
believe that such contract is entered between and among individuals. It is 
the contract of freedom and is done under individuals’ consent. Pateman 
claims that to view a contract in that perspective is to ignore the existence 
of both sexes in bodily form. And therefore, one is able to advance 
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women’s interests if and only if he or she first and foremost appreciates 
the sexual differences.  
 
The Pretence of Universality 
The first pillar of pretence is citizenship. Citizenship is a precondition to 
participate in public politics (Stevens, 2007). Being a citizen means 
having formal civil and political rights. As we argued elsewhere in this 
article, citizenship is inextricably tied to the public as opposed to the 
private sphere. Here the public comprises of both the state and civil 
society and the private is defined institutionally as the relations and 
activities of domestic life (Squires, 1999). It was John Locke who 
proposed the relation between men and women along the public and 
private spheres. According to him, the state of nature forced individuals to 
fear death and therefore the need to form a social contract.  
 
That means a contract that is based on consent, and the one that would 
protect all against all. Interestingly, Locke’s state of nature shows that 
prior to the consent men were already dominant in their families. He 
argued that a wife’s subjection to her husband had a foundation in nature. 
This implies that women were excluded from the status of being 
“individual” which is basic to consent theory. The argument which is 
always advanced by feminists is that if a wife’s subjection to her husband 
has a “natural” foundation, she cannot at the same time be “naturally” free 
and equal individual. This means that citizenship is a natural property of 
man in his public sphere. Supporting this view, Pateman (1989) argues 
that “citizenship has been made in the male image”. The artificial 
inclusion of women as citizen works differently from the original 
inclusion of men. Pateman (1980) furthers that: 
 
Consent is central to liberal democracy, because it is essential to 
maintain individual freedom and equality; but it is a problem for 
liberal democracy, because individual freedom and equality is 
also a pre-condition for the practice of consent. The identification 
of enforced submission with consent in rape is a stark example of 
the wider failure in liberal democratic theory and practice to 
distinguish free commitment and agreement by equals from 
domination, subordination, and inequality. 
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The above quotation suggests that citizenship is an ideological 
euphemism of liberalism founded on a false consent. Using that “consent” 
men are able to enjoy freedom and equality while women are subjected to 
men’s domination. And therefore, men are considered to be citizens, the 
fact which allows them to participate fully in politics. The second pillar of 
pretence is equality. This means, treating all human beings equally. In the 
Subjection of Woman, Mills advocated “a principle of perfect equality, 
admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the 
other” (Mill, 1985). But it has to be stated that equality in liberalism is 
equality of opportunity as opposed to outcome. As Stevens (2007) 
maintains, “women’s access to full social citizenship requires formal 
equality of opportunity on a basis of equal treatment”.  
 
The author fails to state clearly how that state of affairs can be achieved. 
To be emphasized here, though in risk of repetition, is that the 
development of capitalism was the driving force in separating the public 
from the private sphere. In a way, it was capitalism which accorded men a 
sense of citizenship and the associated bourgeois rights in their public 
sphere. Paradoxically, liberalism does not seek fundamental changes of 
the system to ensure equal treatment instead it advocates for equal 
opportunity without dismantling the unequal system of capitalism. 
Einhorn (2005) thus argues that “The neo-liberal market paradigm 
empowers the male economic actor as the citizen with the capacity to 
exchange contracts in the market-place. Without social entitlements, for 
example to adequate and affordable childcare, in a context where women 
are still seen as primarily responsible for looking after children, they do 
not have an equal capacity to access the public spheres of either the 
market or the polity”. Stevens (2007) posits that women’s economic 
position, status and power in the societies of OECD (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries at the start of 
twenty-first century fail to measure up to that of men. This observation is 
instructive insofar as it places men to be the standard measure of women 
demands to access the public sphere and equality. This shortly suggests 
women should be like men, or pretend to be so.  
 
Phillips (1992) submits that “the male body has been the reference point 
in all our phallocratic discourse, and discussions of even sexual equality 
continue to privilege his body. Women can say they want to be treated the 
same – but this means being treated as if they were men; or they can 
demand laws that are specific to their needs- but this means being 
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compensated for their lesser abilities or role”. It is along this line of 
reasoning, Gatens (1992) argues that equality in this context can involve 
only the abstract opportunity to become equal to men. It is the male body, 
and its historical and culturally determined powers and capacities, that is 
taken as the norm or the standard of the liberal “individual” or citizen. 
The third pillar of pretence is representation. Historically women have 
been excluded from participation in the formal institutions of politics. As 
we argued elsewhere, the reason to this phenomenon is found in the 
artificial separation between the public and private spheres which denies 
women to be citizen. Stevens (2007) puts: 
Men in western societies acquired a substantial body of civil 
rights- rights to justice and to own property- before the 
achievement of political rights. The right of all men to participate 
fully in the political life of the state, an aspiration of the 
revolutionaries of the late eighteen century, was acquired only 
gradually as autocratic and absolute rule was replaced by liberal 
democratic systems. However, for women the position has largely 
been reversed. Civil as well as political rights have had to be 
fought for and the acquisition of political rights has often been 
seen not only as an end in itself but an essential means of securing 
equality in other spheres of rights.  
 
Women are under-represented in the formal institutions of political and 
economic life. According to IPU (2019) the worldwide average women 
representation in the parliaments is only 24%. One of the simple 
advanced reason is that women are less interested in politics than men. In 
Great Britain, for example, the government’s Central Statistical Office 
report on women states that “women are not particularly interested in 
politics” (Stephenson quoted in Squires, 1999).  
 
This position was supported by a government survey which showed that 
only 7 per cent of women claimed to be “very interested” in politics, and 
a MORI poll to accompany the 75th anniversary of women’s rights 
showed that 76 per cent of women were not involved in any form of 
party-political activity (Squires ibid.: 196). If representation connotes 
representation of interests, beliefs, constituencies and identities, how are 
women included in the formal politics? If male dominates the public 
sphere how can they really represent women? Through the mythology of 
the “affirmative action” women continue to suffer male domination. The 
centrality of that action is to effect inclusion of the marginalised groups 
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into the major decision-making organs, employment, and education. Brest 
and Oshige (1995) define an affirmative action as a program initiated to 
seek remedy of the significant underrepresentation of members of certain 
racial, ethnic or other groups through measures that take group 
membership or identity into account. This definition emphasizes on two 
things. The first one is the question to cure exclusion by inclusion and the 
second is the issue of who should benefit out of the program, which is the 
group that has suffered exclusion and not the third party or an individual 
member. However, critics of affirmative action pose one fundamental 
question: Is affirmative action inherently preferential, discriminatory, and 
thus inconsistent with the constitution’s guarantee of equal protection? 
(Collier, 1995). Collier responds this question in affirmative. Consistent 
with this view, Farber (1994) sees affirmative action as the reverse 
discrimination.  
 
To them if the constitution stipulates the equality of opportunity and 
avoids in any way to mention any sort of discrimination, that alone is 
sufficient to protect every individual. Writing on the American political 
system, Jeffrey (1997) puts that “No matter how hard politicians run from 
it, this issue is not going away. The Declaration of Independence, for 
example, does not say that because of past discrimination some are more 
equal than others. It does not say that for some pursuit of happiness needs 
to be constrained because of past privileges; no, it insists, boldly, that here 
in America, we are all equal under the law”. While this argument is 
convincing, it is narrow and too legalistic. For one thing, it misses out to 
raise important questions like who enacted that Declaration and for whose 
interests. It is ridiculous to argue emphatically that all people are equal 
before the law without looking deeper into those laws themselves. One 
may raise questions, for example, were women in the process of enacting 
that Declaration? How are their concerns taken into account? The fact that 
women in America won the voting franchise around 1920s raises doubt 
on the fairness of the laws themselves. Writing on the parliaments of the 
advanced industrial democracies, Caul (1999) argues that women 
participate little in the national decision-making process which not only 
limits diversity but also contradicts one of the central tenets of 
representative democracy. It is along this line of reasoning that Brown 
(2001) submits that, “No process could adequately address gender 
interests without taking into account female representation within formal 
political institutions. Higher levels of women's representation can 
empower women as a result of both the creation of more equitable 
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opportunities for women to participate in politics and the greater concern 
with gender interests that female policy-makers are supposed to have”. 
 
The fourth pillar of pretence is the use of gender-neutral language. 
Liberalism always strives to avoid any mention of sex. It, therefore, 
makes use of “universal”, neutral and static terms such as “individuals”, 
“citizen”, and “worker”. But this “gender-neutral abstraction” camouflage 
the male dominance. Phillips (1992) argues that “Human identity is 
sexually differentiated, and exists in a bodily form. Those who seek to 
deny the body, who deal only in the abstraction of ‘the individual’ or ‘the 
citizen’, who think it should not make any difference whether these 
individuals are women or men, will be writing in one sex alone as their 
standard. Women can be encompassed on an equality with men only if 
sexual difference is first of all acknowledged”. While I share Phillips’ 
language argument, I do not agree on the fact that women will attain 
equality once they become like men. It should be acknowledged that 
language is a product of society and it must carry with it the culture, 
norms, and practices of time and space. Swila (2004) submits that: 
Language is a product of social conventions in that linguistic 
structures, their meanings and uses are shared by the entire 
community; the individual’s freedom in her or his linguistic 
choices only has meaning within these conventions. Language is a 
crucial aspect of culture: it expresses cultural values and 
preoccupations and transmits these new generations. Gendered 
relations found in other social aspects are necessarily present and 
enacted in language as well. Therefore, by examining language, 
we are able to reconstitute the values and beliefs of a community 
through time. Language is dynamic and evolves to reflect changes 
in the society it serves; if more positive and equal gender relations 
are created, they will be reflected in language. 
 
The above quoted paragraph shows clearly that language is not neutral. In 
political studies, the field of international relations is for example 
perceived to be a man’s game. With very few exceptions, men are the 
government leaders, diplomats, and high-ranking international military 
and civil servants. Ferris (2004) maintains that sexual language is used to 
mobilize male soldiers, foster their camaraderie, and inspire them to 
assert their masculinity. She observes that US and allied pilots in the Gulf 
War were shown pornographic films as part of their pre-aid preparations. 
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This article notes that the language of political theory is infused with 
gender stereotyping. Supported by capitalism and the consent theory, 
liberalism locates women in the private sphere. In masking its exclusion 
tendencies, liberalism purports to employ neutral vocabularies such as 
“citizen”, “individual”, “worker”, “representation”, “equality”, and 
“freedom.” Macdonell (1986) submits that liberalism subscribes to the 
idea of individuality and sameness. That is, on the one hand, we are all 
free to do what we please; and, on the other hand, we all speak the same 
language, hold the same values and know the same truths unless, that is, 
we are aberrant and abnormal. This is indeed fallacious. Young (1997) 
argues that the paradox of individualism and sameness underlies 
liberalism’s notion that there exists a universal standard of rationality that 
forms the core essence common to all “normal” people. Those who act 
against such standard do so because they are in the first-place irrational in 
their lives. And therefore, liberalism makes this notion of universal 
rationality as the essence of humanity, the basis of its epistemology and 
politics, which valorise rational objectivity and its supported embodiment 
of scientific inquiry and institutions of government.  
 
To de-construct the political theory and the task of engendering is still a 
challenge amid centuries of women’s movements. One is either to look 
for theories of identity and subjectivity that will find women’s vocabulary 
in the contemporary political theory. This would mean reversing the 
situation by seeking women’s domination. Secondly, is to reconstruct the 
theories to be neutral and this entails confirming the status quo. Finally, is 
to seek rights as men are treated which would imply that the male 
political behaviour is the standard and desirable one for women to aspire. 
The current choice is to unpack the language of political theories so as to 
iron out gender bias. In liberal societies, this should see the fundamental 
change of the capitalist system which supports the public/private 
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